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ABSTRACT 
Backgound: The final outcome of any resource allocation decision in healthcare cannot be determined in advance. 
Thus decision makers, in deciding which new programme to implement (or not), need to accommodate the 
uncertainty of different potential outcomes (i.e., change in both health and costs) that can occur, the size and 
nature (i.e., “bad” or “good”) of these outcomes and how they are being valued. Using the decision making plane 
(DMP), which explicitly incorporates opportunity costs and relaxes the assumptions of perfect divisibility and 
constant returns to scale of the cost-effectiveness plane, all the potential outcomes of each resource allocation 
decision can be described. 
Objective: In this study we describe the development and testing of an instrument, using a discrete choice 
experiment methodology, allowing the measurement of public preferences for potential outcomes falling in 
different quadrants of the DMP. 
Method: In a sample of 200 participants providing 4,200 observations we compared four versions of the 
preferences-elicitation instrument using a range of indicators. 
Results: We identified one version that was well accepted by the participants and with good measurement 
properties. 
Conclusion:This validated instrument can now be used in a larger representative sample to study the preferences 
of the public for potential outcomes stemming from re-allocation of healthcare resources. 
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Key points for decision makers 
1. A validated preferences-elicitation instrument was developed that can be used in a representative sample of 
the general population. 
2. This study found preliminary evidence of non-linearities in public valuation of outcomes stemming from 
reallocation of healthcare resources. 
3. This study describes a comprehensive methodology for testing and comparing the properties of preferences-
elicitation instruments, which can be applied to other discrete choice experiments. 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
 
If healthcare budgets were unlimited, all most effective treatments could be adopted. However, resources allocated 
to healthcare are scarce, hence health policy decision-makers (HPDMs) need to decide how to best allocate them. 
Resources scarcity can occur in different contexts (i.e., fixed budgets, shrinking budget with less resources 
allocated to healthcare, growing budget with more resources allocated to healthcare) as long as the total amount 
of resources available is not sufficient to support the implementation of all the most effective treatments. As a 
result of scarcity, HPDMs need to determine where the resources should come from to fund the implementation 
of new treatments to replace or complement existing treatments. For example, in the case of a fixed budget, 
HPDMs may decide to cancel existing treatment(s) in order to free up resources to implement the new 
treatment(s). In the case of a growing budget, because not all new treatments can be implemented, HPDMs would 
still need to decide which new treatment(s) to implement and which ones to abandon. 
 
This resources allocation decision (RAD) is challenging because it typically requires to trade off potential health 
gains for patients who will benefit from the new treatment against potential health losses for those who will see 
their current treatment being cancelled or replaced (or potential new treatment not adopted). In this context, 
HPDMs need to consider the opportunity costs of their decisions to “ensure that the value of what is gained from 
an activity [e.g., implementing the new treatment] outweighs the value of what has to be sacrificed [e.g., cancelling 
an existing treatment]”[1]. 
 
Cost–Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) is widely advocated as a tool to help HPDMs to allocate the resources 
available in a way that maximizes the health benefits produced to the population. The analytical tool of CEA is 
the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER), which is then compared with a threshold ICER to determine 
whether the new treatment should be implemented. Assuming that healthcare resources are efficiently used, this 
threshold ICER should in principle correspond to the ICER of the last treatment adopted [2] and would then 
correspond to the shadow price of the budget constraint. However, it has been shown that this approach would 
lead to an optimal use of healthcare resources only under the strong assumptions of perfect divisibility and constant 
returns to scale of all treatments [3]–[5]. Birch & Gafni (B&G) have suggested an alternative approach relaxing 
these two questionable assumptions [2],[3]. Other studies also questioned the validity of the “ICER of the last 
treatment adopted” as threshold to guide the RAD [6]. Eckerman & Pekarsky showed that the shadow price is 
impacted by different factors such as type of financing (i.e., expansion of healthcare budget vs. displacement of 
existing resources) and whether existing resources were optimally allocated or not. For instance, when funding is 
done by expansion of the healthcare budget in an economically efficient system, the shadow price should 
correspond to the ICER of the “best” (i.e., most cost-effective) existing programme. When the funding is done by 
displacement of existing  resources in an economically inefficient system, the shadow price should depend on the 
ICERs of the “best” programme, of the “worst” (i.e., least cost-effective) programme and of the displaced 
programme [6]. The B&G approach is based on the key concept of opportunity cost. The differences are: (i) It 
does not require the use of underlying unrealistic assumptions and their consequences [3], and (ii) it does not 
require the use of an ICER and a ICER threshold. The B&G approach identifies the source of the additional 
resource requirements of the new program and makes recommendation regarding the adoption of the new program 
based on a direct comparison of the total additional benefits produced from the new program with the total benefits 
forgone. In doing so it ensures, that if followed and under conditions of certainty, “the value of what is gained 
from an activity outweighs the value of what has to be sacrificed” [1]. 
 
In the past two decades it has been recognized that both costs and effects of all programs are stochastic, and then 
the B&G approach has been extended to account for the uncertainty in costs and effects of re-allocating resources 
[7], [8]. Visually, it takes the form of a Decision Making Plane (DMP) allowing to describe all the possible 
outcomes stemming from resource reallocation due to the uncertainty [7]. The cost-effectiveness plane (CEP) 
describes only the difference in health outcomes (E) and costs (C) of a candidate treatment for implementation 
(A1) with a reference one (A0) using measures of incremental effectiveness (∆EA = EA1 − EA0) and increment 
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costs (∆CA = CA1 − CA0). Those measures are used to compute the ICER and compare it to the ICER threshold.  
The DMP “extends” the CEP by also comparing a candidate treatment(s) for cancellation (B1) with another 
reference treatment(s) (B0)1 (i.e., the explicit consideration of the source of additional resources), leading thus to 
another set of incremental effects (∆EB = EB1 − EB0) and costs (∆CB = CB1 − CB0). All these incremental 
measures are used to compute net changes in health outcomes (∆E = ∆EA − ∆EB) and costs (∆C = ∆CA − ∆CB) 
which are then mapped into the DMP (Figure 1A). The DMP is divided into four quadrants which will affect the 
RAD. Quadrant I (QI) describes situations where the joint decision to replace A0 by A1 and B1 by B0 allows 
improving the population health (i.e., E > 0) for an overall lower level of medical expenditures (i.e., C < 0). At 
the opposite, quadrant III (QIII) describes situations where population health is decreased (i.e., E < 0) and medical 
expenditures increased (i.e., C > 0). Quadrant II (QII) describes situations where both the population health and 
level of medical expenditures are decreased (i.e., E < 0; C < 0). Quadrant IV (QIV) describes situations where 
both the population health and level of medical expenditures are increased (i.e., E > 0; C > 0). 
 
In terms of health policy decision-making, the decision to replace existing treatments in order to free up resources 
for the implementation of a new treatment should be made, ideally, only if the final outcome will be located in 
QI. However, this cannot be guaranteed because, as explained, net changes in population health and medical 
expenditures are uncertain, such that RAD becomes a risky decision. Each proposed way of allocating healthcare 
resources might have a non-null probability to end up in each of the four quadrants of the DMP. This uncertainty 
can be represented by a joint distribution of net changes over the DMP (Figure 1B). Given this element of risk, 
the RAD will depend not only on the probabilities of falling in the four DMP quadrants, but also on how HPDMs 
value each possible situations. It would be too restrictive to assume that HPDMs view all potential situations as 
being equally desirable [8]. The valuation of each (E; C) situation is likely to depend on the specific quadrant 
that it falls in and the exact location within the quadrant.  Assuming, for example, that HPDMs positively value 
an improvement in population health and a decrease in the level of medical expenditures, a situation falling in QIII 
should be perceived as “bad” (i.e., to have a negative value), and likewise a QI situation should be seen as “good” 
(i.e., to have a positive value). But this description of HPDMs’ preferences for changes in population health and 
medical expenditures remains largely incomplete. It is unknown whether: (i) HPDMs would be more concerned 
by a “bad” situation rather than a comparable (same-size) “good” situation; (ii) all situations falling in QI (QIII) 
should be seen as equally “good” (“bad”). Also (E; C) situations can fall in quadrants II and IV where one 
outcome is “good” and the other is “bad”.   The answers to these questions depend on both the sign and size of 
HPDMs’ preferences for net changes in population health and medical expenditures. To the best of our knowledge 
such valuation function, that describes the preferences (or value attributed) for every potential outcome in each 
quadrant of the DMP, does not exist. In order to measure such function one first needs to develop and validate a 
tool which will provide reliable measures of preferences for net changes in population health and medical 
expenditures. This is the objective of this study. In this study we report the development and testing of a 
preference-elicitation instrument (PEI) which can be used to measure preferences for changes in population health 
and medical expenditures in a context of resources scarcity. 
 
2: METHODS 
 
2.1: Developing a preference elicitation instrument (PEI) 
 
2.1.1: Choice experiment 
The discrete choice experiment (DCE) methodology was used to measure preferences for net changes in health 
outcomes and costs. DCEs are commonly used in health for eliciting preferences for a wide range of policy 
                                                          
1 The DMP can also be extended to the case where more than one existing treatments have to be replaced in order 
to free up resources for the implement of the new treatment. 
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questions [9], [10]. We use the concept of healthy year equivalent (HYE)2 [11] to describe net changes in health 
outcomes (E) and amount of Euros for net changes in the medical expenditures (C). In our study, we used a 
modified DCE format known as best-worst scaling (BWS) case III. Unlike the standard DCE approach which 
only asks participants to identified their most preferred choice option (i.e., BEST choice), the BWS approach also 
asks them to identify their least preferred option (i.e., WORST choice). This approach allows for a full rank 
ordering of the situations and then provide more information about individuals’ preferences for the same number 
of choice tasks [12]. 
 
Whilst there are studies in the DCE literature explaining how to identify relevant attributes, to the best of our 
knowledge there is no comparable evidence regarding the selection of attributes’ levels. Furthermore, 
methodological research on the designing of DCEs showed that individuals’ preferences were not invariant to 
changes in the range of attributes’ levels [13]. Unfortunately this issue has been overlooked in the DCE literature 
and there is no validated approach to identify the “best set” of attributes’ levels. In our study we addressed this 
issue by testing and comparing four different versions of the BW-DCE questionnaire that only differ in terms of 
attributes’ levels: The ranges of possible values for the E attribute were {-4; -2; 0; +2; +4} and {-8; -4; 0; +4; 
+8} for versions 1 & 2 (V1-2) and versions 3 & 4 (V3-4) respectively; The ranges of possible values for the C 
attribute were {-60,000; -30,000; 0; +30,000; +60,000} and {-120,000; -60,000; 0; +60,000; +120,000} for V1 
and V2-4 respectively. All four versions were based on a D-Efficient design [14], [15] allowing for the estimation 
of all main effects and one continuous interaction effect between E and C. However, we used non-informative 
(i.e., null) priors about participants’ preferences to generate the list of choice tasks for V1-3 and used results from 
V3 as informative (i.e., non-null) priors to design the tasks for V4. This last version also included 12 experimental 
tasks (instead of 10) to allow for the estimation of two alternative-specific constants in addition to the other 
effects3. 
 
In every choice task we included three generic situations (i.e., scenario 1; scenario 2; scenario 3) (Figure 2) to 
reflect the uncertainty in the consequences of reallocating healthcare resources. In the information sheet of the 
questionnaire, the participants were told that deciding to reallocate resources would have uncertain consequences 
which are represented by the different scenarios. One of these generic situations was designed to correspond to 
the origin point of the DMP, hereafter neutral changes situation (NCS). The specification of the BW-DCE was 
completed by manually designing two quality checks. For the estimation of individuals’ preferences, only answers 
to the experimentally designed choice tasks were considered. The order of the choice tasks within the 
questionnaire and the order of the alternatives within the choice tasks were randomised across participants to 
control for potential order effects (e.g., left-to-right, learning/fatigue). 
 
2.1.2: Sampling 
The development of our PEI took place in France. In  2016, we contacted a market research company to recruit a 
total of 200 participants from the general population. V4 of the instrument was administered two months after the 
first three versions4. Participants were randomly allocated to V1-V3. We used the same recruitment procedure for 
                                                          
2 Those who prefer to use quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) as a measure of health outcome can use the 
methodology described in this paper but will need to change the description of the health outcome in the 
instrument. 
3 We used the same experimental design for V1-3 because we specified null preferences for the E and C 
attributes, making thus the D-efficiency measure insensitive to changes in the magnitude only of the attributes’ 
levels. The purpose of V4 was to investigate whether a “better” (i.e., statistically more efficient) design would 
allow building a better PEI. The gain in statistical efficiency was obtained by relaxing the assumption of null 
preferences for E and C, using V3 as non-null priors for the designing of V4. 
4 The V4 was administered two months after the three other versions because we first needed to analyse data 
obtained from V3 before being able to improve the statistical efficiency of the V4 design (by using V3 results as 
non-null priors). 
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all four versions. Following Louviere et al (2010) [16] formulae5, we needed to recruit a minimum of 44 
participants per version (rounded up at 50). 
 
2.2: Empirical testing of the preferences-elicitation instrument 
As there is no validated approach regarding the selection of the “best set” of attributes’ levels, we used different 
criteria to compare the four DCE versions in terms of statistical performance (predictive validity), behavioural 
realism (properties of participants’ choices) and acceptability by the participants. This multi-criteria analysis 
should increase our chance to identify the best PEI. 
 
2.2.1: Debriefing questions 
The participants were asked to rate the interest in and difficulty of the questionnaire on a 5-points scale. Then we 
asked them to answer questions related to how they made their choices: (i) Decision objective (i.e., random choice; 
decision to minimise C; decision to maximise E; to find a compromise between E and C); (ii) Minimum 
acceptable level of E, and maximum acceptable level of C; (iii) Importance of E and C. Differences between 
the four choice experiments were investigated using Chi-2 tests. 
 
2.2.2: Properties of participants’ choices 
In addition to the experimental choice tasks, we also included two additional tasks to control for the quality of 
participants’ choices. One task was used to check the monotonicity of participants’ choices. In the monotonicity 
task, one option was the best and one was the worst in terms of both E and C. Participants’ were expected to 
choose the best option as “most preferred” and the worst one as “least preferred”. The second quality check 
consisted was a stability task. We tested the stability of choices by repeating task #2 as 2nd last task. Participants 
were expected to pass the stability test when at least one of their choices was repeated. 
 
We also defined two other quality measures based on serial non-participation (i.e., participants who systematically 
select either the left, middle or right-located option) and response time (RT). A participant was classified as serial 
non-participant when s/he selected the NCS situation as BEST in more than 80% of the choice tasks. We recorded 
the RTs at the task level to identify “speedsters” (i.e., participants who tended to answer the choice tasks “too 
quickly”). A “quick decision” was defined as a choice with a RT falling in the 1st quintile of the corresponding 
RT distribution. A participant was considered as a “speedster” when s/he made quick decisions in at least 80% of 
the choice tasks. We compared the proportions of participants who pass/fail the quality checks using Chi-2 tests. 
 
2.2.3: Behavioural realism 
Multi-attribute choices are typically analysed using the random utility maximisation (RUM) framework [17], [18]. 
 
The “base case” model can be written: 
Untj = β1Entj + β2Cntj + εntj        (Eq. 1) 
 
Where Untj corresponds to the utility (U) derived by respondent (n) at task (t) from the option (j), ntj are modelling 
errors, and the (β1, β2) parameters capture the main effect of a 1-unit change in E attribute (i.e., +1 HYE) and in 
C (i.e., +10,000 euros) on participants’ choices respectively. We expect to find positive preferences for E, 
meaning that on average participants would positively respond to better health outcomes, and negative preferences 
for C, meaning that participants would negatively respond to increase in level of medical expenditures. 
 
However, as suggested by Gafni et al., there is a priori no guarantee that this reference specification provides the 
best account of participants’ decisions [8]. For each version of the choice experiment, we estimated 32 different 
                                                          
5 The formulae is for choice proportions and it allows testing whether observed proportions significantly differ 
from proportions that would be obtained by chance (In our case, 33% as there is three choice options per task): 
H0: proportion = 33%; H1: proportion ≠ 33%. 
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specifications allowing for more flexible choice behaviours: (i) Non-linear preferences (in E and/or C); (ii) 
Interaction effect between E and C; (iii) NCS bias; (iv) Choices inconsistency. As the number of parameters 
differs across the models, we used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to identify the best performing 
specification for each version (i.e., the specification associated with the smallest BIC value). 
 
The more sophisticated specification of the choice model would take the following form: 
 
Untj = exp(β1TYPEntj)[β2NCSntj + [β3E{Max loss} + β4E{Min loss} + β5E{Min gain} +
β6E{Max gain}] + [β7C{Max loss} + β8C{Min loss} + β9C{Min gain} + β10C{Max gain}] +
β11(Enjt × Cntj)] + εntj         (Eq. 2) 
 
Where (β1) captures an effect of the type of choices (i.e., BEST vs. WORST) on the errors variance, (β2) a 
preference for the NCS above and beyond the preferences for E and C, (β3-β6) are parameters capturing the 
preferences for the different E values relative to a null change, (β7-β10) are similar parameters for the C attribute, 
and finally (β11) is a parameter capturing an interaction effect between E and C. 
 
In terms of behavioural realism of the choice model, the best version is expected to be the one associated with: 
(i) Non-linear preferences for at least one attribute; (ii) Non-significant bias towards NCS; (iii) Significant 
interaction effect between preferences for E and C ([19], [20], [21]). 
 
2.2.4: Predictive validity 
The relative performance of choice models across the four versions of the choice experiment can be compared in 
terms of ability to predict individuals’ choices. We use a cross-validation (CV) procedure to determine the level 
of predictive validity of each model on its corresponding version. The CV procedure consists in randomly splitting 
the sample into two groups, namely an estimation sample and a validation sample. The observations from the 
estimation sample are used to estimate the choice model, and the estimates are then used to predict choices 
observed in validation sample. The predictive validity corresponds to the % of correct matches between predicted 
and observed choices. Because sample sizes are limited, we proceed to a 75%-25% repartition of the respondents 
between the estimation and validation samples respectively. The CV procedure was repeated 10,000 times to 
compute mean score of predictive validity and associated 95% confidence interval. 
 
3: RESULTS 
 
3.1: Samples of respondents 
The proportion of men was approximately 50% in all four samples (44%-50%). About a quarter of the respondents 
reported a less than good health status (20%-30%) and a third declared at least one chronic condition (28%-44%). 
The samples mainly included respondents with a higher level of education (either University or college degree) 
(62%-84%). In overall the differences in sample characteristics across the four versions don’t reach significance, 
thus suggesting there is no sample selection bias (i.e., some profiles of participants are not significantly more 
represented in one group compared to the others). 
 
3.2: Debriefing questions 
Results are reported in Table 1. The descriptive analysis of debriefing questions indicates that overall the 
participants considered the questionnaire as being interesting (≈ 70%) and easy to answer (≈ 50%). A majority of 
participants were willing to trade net changes in health outcomes (E) against net changes in medical expenditures 
(C). V4 appeared to be more interesting (+ 20 points) (P = 0.004) than the other ones. This version also has an 
impact on the individuals’ perception of the E and C attributes. In this version, 48% of the participants declare 
not being willing to accept a net change in health outcomes below +8 HYE (which also corresponds to the 
maximum value presented to the participants). However we don’t find a similar effect for net changes in medical 
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expenditures with only 16% of the participants not being willing to accept an option offering a level of change 
below the maximum value. 
 
3.3: Properties of participants’ choices 
Results are presented in Table 2. Regarding the monotonicity of preferences, all four versions of the choice 
experiment were associated with high levels of performance. However, V4 appeared to perform better than the 
other ones (+10-16 points) but this difference did not reach significance (P = 0.147). V4 outperformed the other 
versions in terms of stability (P < 0.001); it achieved better performance in terms of serial non-participation and 
response time (+6-8 points) but the difference did not reach significance (P = 0.283 and P = 0.580, respectively). 
 
Regarding the results of the RTs analysis, we found a similar pattern of RTs across the four versions of the choice 
experiment. The 1st choice task (task #1) is associated with significantly longer RTs, and then RTs tend to slightly 
decrease over the sequence of tasks. Although most of RT differences between the four versions did not reach 
significance, V4 appeared to be systematically associated with longer RT at every task. This last result might 
indicate that participants might have been more engaged in the completion of the choice tasks [22]. 
 
3.4: Behavioural realism 
Results are presented in Table 36. Regarding V1 and V3, the best fitting choice model appeared to be a model 
allowing for linear preferences for both E and C. At the opposite final model for V2 and V4 allowed for non-
linearities in preferences for E and/or C. In V1 and V3, there was evidence of a NCS bias. In all versions but 
V4 we found a significant interaction effect between preferences for E and C. Overall the results verify our a 
priori assumptions regarding the nature of respondents’ preferences for E and C attributes (i.e., positive effect 
of gains; negative effect of losses; monotonic preferences for changes in E/C). 
 
3.5: Predictive validity 
Results are presented in Figure 3. With a level of predictive validity close to 78%, the version V4 appeared to 
perform significantly better than the other ones. This high level of predictive validity indicates that most of 
participants made choices that can be well explained by the RUM hypothesis, providing thus evidence that 
participants were actually making trade-offs between the E and C attributes. 
 
4: DISCUSSION 
The objective of this study was to develop and test a preferences-elicitation instrument (PEI) that can then be used 
in large representative sample of the general population to identify the outcome valuation function needed to help 
the decision makers to decide whether a given distribution of potential situations is acceptable or not, which will 
affect the decision to reallocate (or not) resources.  After having compared four different versions of the PEI in 
terms of data quality, behavioural realism and predictive validity, version 4 (V4) was identified as best. To the 
best of our knowledge, it is the first time that such an instrument is being developed. A copy of the instrument is 
provided as online supplementary material. 
 
We find that public preferences were sensitive both to the range of values for medical expenditures and health 
outcomes, and to the design of the PEI. The two versions based on “extended” sets of attributes’ values (i.e., V3 
and V4) outperformed V1 which was based on a “narrow” set of values. Increasing the level of statistical efficiency, 
and thus presumably making the choice tasks more difficult, also had a positive effect on the preferences 
elicitation. In the DCE literature, it is usually argued that participants would respond to an increase in task 
difficulty by adopting simplifying decision rules or making more random decisions [23]. In our case making the 
choice tasks more statistically efficient (and presumably more difficult) was not correlated with an increase in 
perceived difficulty (as reported by the participants). This result suggests that an increase in the statistical 
efficiency of the tasks could also have made the choice situations more realistic and more engaging for the 
                                                          
6 Summary information about all model specifications can be found in online supplementary material. 
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participants, leading this to better quality data. Overall our study results indicate that small changes in the design 
of the choice tasks can have significant effects on stated preferences. This result is consistent with the hypothesis 
of ill-defined/malleable preferences [24], [25] following which  individuals would not know a priori how much 
they value the different product attributes and therefore would “build their preferences on the fly”. Previous studies 
have investigated the effect of manipulating some experimental features, such as level of statistical efficiency, on 
respondents’ choices [26], [27] and provide mixed evidence. 
 
In the past, studies have already used the DCE methodology to investigate public preferences for the allocation of 
healthcare resources [28]–[36]. We cannot compare our results to this literature because our study differs in one 
central feature: the way the resource constraint was described and incorporated. Whilst the previous studies were 
motivated by the context of resources scarcity (i.e., because resources are limited it becomes important to 
understand public preferences regarding how these scarce resource should be used), they did not explicitly 
incorporate the resource constraint in the decision problem (i.e., the question asked). Our study is different because 
it forces the respondent to deal with the consequences of taking into account the opportunity costs of implementing 
a new program (e.g., having to make a decision where a programme(s) have to be cancelled to free up resources 
to implement a new programme and what would be the outcome of such decision). We explained, carefully, to all 
participants the meaning of the concepts of resources scarcity and opportunity costs and their implications when 
making a decision about reallocation of resources. 
 
Our study is not exempt from limitations. First, due to sample size limitation we were unable to explore the impact 
of respondents’ characteristics on their preferences for health outcomes and medical expenditures. Erdem & 
Thompson (2014) used a latent class approach to investigate preferences heterogeneity and found the existence 
of three different classes of preferences [29]. As this flexible modelling of respondents’ choices requires a large 
amount of data, we plan to repeat this analysis in a bigger sample. Second, the recruitment of the participants was 
done at two different points in time (i.e., participants to the V4 were recruited two months after those for V1-V3) 
which might have introduced a potential bias in our comparison. However, this seems unlikely as (i) the 
recruitment procedure was the same for all four versions, (ii) the main samples socio-demographic characteristics 
did not significantly differ between the four samples, and (iii) the time lag was relatively short (i.e., only two 
months). Our instrument measures preferences for two core elements of the decision making process, namely 
changes in health outcomes and medical expenditures. In real life situations, decision makers are likely to take 
into account more factors (e.g., profile of the patients who will benefit from the new intervention and those who 
will lose, etc.). However, a priori we had no guarantee that members of the general population would be willing 
to make such difficult decisions and then we decided to focus on the core dimensions of resources reallocation. 
There is no point making the the instrument more complex by including other factors in the decision making 
process if public already struggles to trade medical expenditures against health outcomes. Building on this work, 
future studies could further improve the quality of our instrument by including additional factors in the decision 
making problem. While we had no formal way of controlling whether participants did consider other factors when 
making their decisions, we tried to prevent/decrease a potential omission bias by explicitly prompting them to 
only consider the information about health outcomes and medical expenditures. 
 
This validated PEI can now be used in a larger sample of participants to measure their preferences for net changes 
in health outcomes and medical expenditures. This information about public preferences can then be used in 
combination with the information described in the DMP to inform the resources allocation decision (RAD). 
Knowing the joint distribution of net changes in health outcomes and medical expenditures, the preferences 
information can be used, for example, to compute the expected value of implementing the new treatment. The 
HPMs may decide to adopt the new intervention only if, for example, the expected value is positive. By following 
this approach the decision-making process would become more transparent and would allow public to have a say 
in the management of healthcare system by letting their preferences for population health and medical 
expenditures influence the RAD. 
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For Figure 1: 
Source: Sendi, P., Gafni, A. & Birch, S. Opportunity costs and uncertainty in the economic evaluation 
of health care interventions. Health Econ. 11, 23–31 (2002). 
Reading: ΔC(A) indicates the incremental costs for programme A; ΔC(B) indicates the 
incremental costs for programme B; ΔE(A) indicates the incremental health outcomes for 
programme A; ΔE(B) indicates the incremental health outcomes for programme B; The Latin 
numbers (I, II, III, IV) are used to describe the four quadrants of the DMP: {Increase in health 
outcomes; Decrease in medical expenditures}; {Decrease in health outcomes; Decrease in 
medical expenditures}; {Decrease in health outcomes; Increase in medical expenditures}; 
{Increase in health outcomes; Increase in medical expenditures}. Panel B illustrates the 
posterior joint distribution taken from an example used in Sendi et al (2002) of introducing 
programme A and cancelling programme B in the decision making plane. 
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 Figure 2. Illustration of choice task format 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 3. Comparison of predictive performance values across the four versions 
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Table 1. Comparison of debriefing questions across the four versions 
 
Characteristic* Level 
V1 
(N=50) 
V2 
(N=50) 
V3 
(N=50) 
V4 
(N=50) 
1. Interest of the questionnaire (P-value = 0.004) 
 Very interesting 36% 26% 32% 58% 
 Interesting 38% 54% 32% 20% 
 Moderately/Slightly/Not at all interesting 26% 20% 36% 22% 
2. Difficulty of the questionnaire (P-value = 0.109) 
 Very easy 12% 8% 14% 26% 
 Easy 44% 48% 40% 32% 
 Neither easy, nor difficult 22% 26% 30% 36% 
 Difficult/Very difficult 22% 18% 16% 6% 
3. Decision making objective (P-value = 0.205) 
 To minimise health expenditures 16% 10% 6% 4% 
 To maximise health outcomes 42% 32% 42% 32% 
 
To find a compromise between health 
expenditures and outcomes 
42% 58% 52% 64% 
4. Minimum acceptable level of health outcomes (P-value = 0.039) 
 1st worst/2nd worst level (Loss) 18% 8% 6% 6% 
 Neutral level (No gain, no loss) 40% 28% 44% 24% 
 2nd best level (Gain) 18% 34% 20% 22% 
 1st best level (Gain) 24% 30% 30% 48% 
5. Minimum acceptable level of health expenditures (P-value = 0.584) 
 1st worst level (Loss/Increase) 18% 8% 16% 22% 
 2nd worst level (Loss/Increase) 12% 10% 10% 8% 
 Neutral level (No gain, no loss) 40% 36% 36% 42% 
 2nd best level (Gain/Decrease) 6% 22% 12% 12% 
 1st best level (Gain/Decrease) 24% 24% 26% 16% 
6. Importance of health outcomes (P-value = 0.667) 
 Very important 48% 50% 56% 64% 
 Important 32% 34% 32% 26% 
 Moderately/Slightly/Not at all important 20% 16% 12% 10% 
7. Importance of health expenditures (P-value = 0.485) 
 Very important 20% 14% 26% 14% 
 Important 38% 52% 34% 44% 
 Moderately important 30% 28% 30% 24% 
  Slightly/Not at all important 12% 6% 10% 18% 
* P-value of Chi-2 test reported in brackets 
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Table 2. Comparison of choices properties across the four versions 
 
Characteristic Level V1 V2 V3 V4 
1. Monotonicity (P-value = 0.147) 
 No 20% 16% 22% 6% 
 Yes 80% 84% 78% 94% 
2. Stability (P-value < 0.001) 
 No 32% 20% 8% 8% 
 Partial 16% 36% 38% 14% 
 Full 52% 44% 54% 78% 
3. Serial non-participation (P-value = 0.283) 
 No 94% 94% 86% 96% 
 Yes 6% 6% 14% 4% 
4. Response time (P-value = 0.580) 
 "Normal" 86% 88% 86% 94% 
  "Speedster" 14% 12% 14% 6% 
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Table 3. Best fitting choice model for the different versions of the choice experiment 
Parameters 
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 
MLE CRSE P-val. MLE CRSE P-val. MLE CRSE P-val. MLE CRSE P-val. 
1. Estimated preferences 
HYE (Continuous) 0.287 0.053 < 0.001 - - - 0.254 0.035 < 0.001 - - - 
 Max. loss - - - -0.617 0.268 0.022 - - - -3.399 0.335 < 0.001 
 Min. loss - - - -1.284 0.195 < 0.001 - - - -1.459 0.161 < 0.001 
 No loss, lo gain (Ref.) - - - -0.060 - - - - - 0.627 - - 
 Min. gain - - - 1.296 0.170 < 0.001 - - - 1.764 0.189 < 0.001 
 Max. gain - - - 0.664 0.228 0.004 - - - 2.468 0.284 < 0.001 
KCOST (Continuous) 0.118 0.028 < 0.001 - - - 0.102 0.017 < 0.001 0.091 0.011 < 0.001 
 Max. loss - - - -1.236 0.267 < 0.001 - - - - - - 
 Min. loss - - - -0.431 0.153 0.005 - - - - - - 
 No loss, lo gain (Ref.) - - - 0.650 - - - - - - - - 
 Min. gain - - - 1.138 0.229 < 0.001 - - - - - - 
 Max. gain - - - -0.120 0.343 0.726 - - - - - - 
2. Other effects 
Decision bias: Neutral situation 0.234 0.100 0.019 - - - 0.683 0.145 < 0.001 - - - 
Interaction: HYE ´ KCOST 0.014 0.005 0.003 -0.014 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.089 - - - 
Choice consistency: BEST vs WORST - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3. Model statistics 
# Observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,200 
# Parameters 4 9 4 5 
Log-likelihood -995.9 -862.9 -869.9 -806.0 
BIC 2,019.4 1,787.9 1,767.3 1,647.5 
MLE: Maximum Likelihood Estimate; CRSE: Cluster Robust Standard Errors; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion 
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- Document: Estimation of different choice model specifications 
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Supplementary material: Estimation of different choice model specifications 
For each of the four DCE versions it was possible to estimate 32 choice models based on different 
specifications of the indirect utility function (for a grand total of 32 x 4 = 128 models): 
1. The preferences for the HYE (E) attribute are linear vs. non-linear; 
2. The preferences for the KCOST (C) attribute are linear vs. non-linear; 
3. Participants have a systematic preference for the neutral change situation “NCS” (ASC_SQ) vs 
don’t have; 
4. Preferences for the HYE and KCOST attributes are dependent vs. independent; 
5. Consistency of participants' choices differ between BEST and WORST choices vs. don’t differ 
The best specification is the one minimising the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). In the below 
table, the best fitting model is highlighted in grey colour for each DCE version, and detailed results for 
these best models are presented in the article. 
 
 
Model Version ASC_SQ HYE KCOST Interaction Scale #par #Obs Loglik. BIC
17 1 Yes Linear Linear Yes No 4 1,000 -995.9 2,019.4
25 1 No Linear Linear Yes No 3 1,000 -1,000.9 2,022.6
31 1 No Linear Non-linear No No 5 1,000 -995.0 2,024.6
1 1 Yes Linear Linear Yes Yes 5 1,000 -995.8 2,026.2
21 1 Yes Linear Linear No No 3 1,000 -1,002.9 2,026.5
27 1 No Linear Non-linear Yes No 6 1,000 -993.4 2,028.3
30 1 No Non-linear Linear No No 5 1,000 -996.9 2,028.3
9 1 No Linear Linear Yes Yes 4 1,000 -1,000.9 2,029.5
15 1 No Linear Non-linear No Yes 6 1,000 -994.9 2,031.3
23 1 Yes Linear Non-linear No No 6 1,000 -995.0 2,031.5
5 1 Yes Linear Linear No Yes 4 1,000 -1,002.6 2,032.8
22 1 Yes Non-linear Linear No No 6 1,000 -995.7 2,032.9
26 1 No Non-linear Linear Yes No 6 1,000 -996.4 2,034.3
11 1 No Linear Non-linear Yes Yes 7 1,000 -993.4 2,035.1
14 1 No Non-linear Linear No Yes 6 1,000 -996.8 2,035.1
19 1 Yes Linear Non-linear Yes No 7 1,000 -993.4 2,035.1
7 1 Yes Linear Non-linear No Yes 7 1,000 -994.9 2,038.2
18 1 Yes Non-linear Linear Yes No 7 1,000 -995.0 2,038.3
32 1 No Non-linear Non-linear No No 8 1,000 -991.7 2,038.6
6 1 Yes Non-linear Linear No Yes 7 1,000 -995.7 2,039.7
29 1 No Linear Linear No No 2 1,000 -1,013.4 2,040.6
10 1 No Non-linear Linear Yes Yes 7 1,000 -996.4 2,041.2
3 1 Yes Linear Non-linear Yes Yes 8 1,000 -993.3 2,041.9
2 1 Yes Non-linear Linear Yes Yes 8 1,000 -994.9 2,045.2
16 1 No Non-linear Non-linear No Yes 9 1,000 -991.6 2,045.4
24 1 Yes Non-linear Non-linear No No 9 1,000 -991.7 2,045.5
28 1 No Non-linear Non-linear Yes No 9 1,000 -991.7 2,045.5
13 1 No Linear Linear No Yes 3 1,000 -1,013.1 2,047.0
8 1 Yes Non-linear Non-linear No Yes 10 1,000 -991.6 2,052.3
12 1 No Non-linear Non-linear Yes Yes 10 1,000 -991.6 2,052.3
20 1 Yes Non-linear Non-linear Yes No 10 1,000 -991.7 2,052.4
4 1 Yes Non-linear Non-linear Yes Yes 11 1,000 -991.6 2,059.2
Table. List of all possible choice models (Part 1)
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Model Version ASC_SQ HYE KCOST Interaction Scale #par #Obs Loglik. BIC
28 2 No Non-linear Non-linear Yes No 9 1,000 -862.9 1,787.9
32 2 No Non-linear Non-linear No No 8 1,000 -867.3 1,789.8
30 2 No Non-linear Linear No No 5 1,000 -878.0 1,790.5
20 2 Yes Non-linear Non-linear Yes No 10 1,000 -862.0 1,793.1
12 2 No Non-linear Non-linear Yes Yes 10 1,000 -862.7 1,794.5
22 2 Yes Non-linear Linear No No 6 1,000 -876.9 1,795.3
24 2 Yes Non-linear Non-linear No No 9 1,000 -866.9 1,796.0
26 2 No Non-linear Linear Yes No 6 1,000 -877.3 1,796.0
14 2 No Non-linear Linear No Yes 6 1,000 -877.3 1,796.1
16 2 No Non-linear Non-linear No Yes 9 1,000 -867.3 1,796.7
4 2 Yes Non-linear Non-linear Yes Yes 11 1,000 -862.0 1,799.9
18 2 Yes Non-linear Linear Yes No 7 1,000 -876.0 1,800.4
6 2 Yes Non-linear Linear No Yes 7 1,000 -876.3 1,800.9
10 2 No Non-linear Linear Yes Yes 7 1,000 -877.0 1,802.3
8 2 Yes Non-linear Non-linear No Yes 10 1,000 -866.9 1,802.9
2 2 Yes Non-linear Linear Yes Yes 8 1,000 -875.8 1,806.9
27 2 No Linear Non-linear Yes No 6 1,000 -903.0 1,847.5
31 2 No Linear Non-linear No No 5 1,000 -907.8 1,850.1
11 2 No Linear Non-linear Yes Yes 7 1,000 -901.7 1,851.7
19 2 Yes Linear Non-linear Yes No 7 1,000 -901.9 1,852.2
23 2 Yes Linear Non-linear No No 6 1,000 -906.9 1,855.2
15 2 No Linear Non-linear No Yes 6 1,000 -907.2 1,855.9
3 2 Yes Linear Non-linear Yes Yes 8 1,000 -900.7 1,856.6
7 2 Yes Linear Non-linear No Yes 7 1,000 -906.4 1,861.2
17 2 Yes Linear Linear Yes No 4 1,000 -925.0 1,877.7
21 2 Yes Linear Linear No No 3 1,000 -930.0 1,880.7
1 2 Yes Linear Linear Yes Yes 5 1,000 -924.9 1,884.3
5 2 Yes Linear Linear No Yes 4 1,000 -929.2 1,886.1
25 2 No Linear Linear Yes No 3 1,000 -934.0 1,888.8
9 2 No Linear Linear Yes Yes 4 1,000 -933.8 1,895.3
29 2 No Linear Linear No No 2 1,000 -946.6 1,907.1
13 2 No Linear Linear No Yes 3 1,000 -946.6 1,914.0
Table. List of all possible choice models (Part 2)
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Model Version ASC_SQ HYE KCOST Interaction Scale #par #Obs Loglik. BIC
17 3 Yes Linear Linear Yes No 4 1,000 -869.9 1,767.3
21 3 Yes Linear Linear No No 3 1,000 -873.3 1,767.4
5 3 Yes Linear Linear No Yes 4 1,000 -873.0 1,773.7
1 3 Yes Linear Linear Yes Yes 5 1,000 -869.7 1,774.0
23 3 Yes Linear Non-linear No No 6 1,000 -868.1 1,777.6
22 3 Yes Non-linear Linear No No 6 1,000 -868.2 1,777.8
18 3 Yes Non-linear Linear Yes No 7 1,000 -868.0 1,784.4
6 3 Yes Non-linear Linear No Yes 7 1,000 -868.1 1,784.5
7 3 Yes Linear Non-linear No Yes 7 1,000 -868.1 1,784.5
19 3 Yes Linear Non-linear Yes No 7 1,000 -868.1 1,784.5
2 3 Yes Non-linear Linear Yes Yes 8 1,000 -867.9 1,791.1
3 3 Yes Linear Non-linear Yes Yes 8 1,000 -868.0 1,791.3
24 3 Yes Non-linear Non-linear No No 9 1,000 -867.0 1,796.2
20 3 Yes Non-linear Non-linear Yes No 10 1,000 -864.0 1,797.0
30 3 No Non-linear Linear No No 5 1,000 -881.5 1,797.6
32 3 No Non-linear Non-linear No No 8 1,000 -873.2 1,801.7
8 3 Yes Non-linear Non-linear No Yes 10 1,000 -867.0 1,803.0
4 3 Yes Non-linear Non-linear Yes Yes 11 1,000 -863.9 1,803.8
26 3 No Non-linear Linear Yes No 6 1,000 -881.3 1,804.1
14 3 No Non-linear Linear No Yes 6 1,000 -881.5 1,804.4
28 3 No Non-linear Non-linear Yes No 9 1,000 -872.4 1,806.9
16 3 No Non-linear Non-linear No Yes 9 1,000 -873.1 1,808.4
10 3 No Non-linear Linear Yes Yes 7 1,000 -881.3 1,811.0
31 3 No Linear Non-linear No No 5 1,000 -888.5 1,811.4
12 3 No Non-linear Non-linear Yes Yes 10 1,000 -872.3 1,813.7
27 3 No Linear Non-linear Yes No 6 1,000 -887.5 1,816.4
15 3 No Linear Non-linear No Yes 6 1,000 -888.1 1,817.6
11 3 No Linear Non-linear Yes Yes 7 1,000 -887.2 1,822.7
25 3 No Linear Linear Yes No 3 1,000 -903.7 1,828.0
9 3 No Linear Linear Yes Yes 4 1,000 -903.6 1,834.8
29 3 No Linear Linear No No 2 1,000 -925.4 1,864.6
13 3 No Linear Linear No Yes 3 1,000 -925.3 1,871.4
Table. List of all possible choice models (Part 3)
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Model Version ASC_SQ HYE KCOST Interaction Scale #par #Obs Loglik. BIC
30 4 No Non-linear Linear No No 5 1,200 -806.0 1,647.5
22 4 Yes Non-linear Linear No No 6 1,200 -805.4 1,653.4
14 4 No Non-linear Linear No Yes 6 1,200 -806.0 1,654.6
26 4 No Non-linear Linear Yes No 6 1,200 -806.0 1,654.6
32 4 No Non-linear Non-linear No No 8 1,200 -799.8 1,656.2
6 4 Yes Non-linear Linear No Yes 7 1,200 -805.4 1,660.4
18 4 Yes Non-linear Linear Yes No 7 1,200 -805.4 1,660.5
24 4 Yes Non-linear Non-linear No No 9 1,200 -798.8 1,661.4
10 4 No Non-linear Linear Yes Yes 7 1,200 -806.0 1,661.7
16 4 No Non-linear Non-linear No Yes 9 1,200 -799.6 1,663.0
28 4 No Non-linear Non-linear Yes No 9 1,200 -799.7 1,663.2
2 4 Yes Non-linear Linear Yes Yes 8 1,200 -805.4 1,667.5
8 4 Yes Non-linear Non-linear No Yes 10 1,200 -798.6 1,668.1
20 4 Yes Non-linear Non-linear Yes No 10 1,200 -798.8 1,668.4
12 4 No Non-linear Non-linear Yes Yes 10 1,200 -799.6 1,670.0
4 4 Yes Non-linear Non-linear Yes Yes 11 1,200 -798.6 1,675.2
27 4 No Linear Non-linear Yes No 6 1,200 -816.4 1,675.3
17 4 Yes Linear Linear Yes No 4 1,200 -824.2 1,676.8
31 4 No Linear Non-linear No No 5 1,200 -822.3 1,680.0
11 4 No Linear Non-linear Yes Yes 7 1,200 -815.9 1,681.3
19 4 Yes Linear Non-linear Yes No 7 1,200 -816.4 1,682.3
1 4 Yes Linear Linear Yes Yes 5 1,200 -823.8 1,683.1
21 4 Yes Linear Linear No No 3 1,200 -831.6 1,684.4
23 4 Yes Linear Non-linear No No 6 1,200 -822.2 1,686.9
15 4 No Linear Non-linear No Yes 6 1,200 -822.2 1,687.0
3 4 Yes Linear Non-linear Yes Yes 8 1,200 -815.8 1,688.4
5 4 Yes Linear Linear No Yes 4 1,200 -831.6 1,691.5
7 4 Yes Linear Non-linear No Yes 7 1,200 -822.2 1,694.0
25 4 No Linear Linear Yes No 3 1,200 -840.6 1,702.6
9 4 No Linear Linear Yes Yes 4 1,200 -840.4 1,709.2
29 4 No Linear Linear No No 2 1,200 -853.9 1,722.0
13 4 No Linear Linear No Yes 3 1,200 -853.8 1,728.8
Table. List of all possible choice models (Part 4)
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Study about funding of new medical interventions 
 
The objective of the study is to understand what your preferences for funding of new medical interventions are. 
 
How to fund new interventions when the healthcare budget is limited? 
 
Like any other public expenditures (e.g., education, transportation, preserving the environment), the health budget is 
limited. Every year new medical treatments are developed. Typically new treatments are more effective but also more 
expensive than those currently available. Replacing current treatments by the new ones would increase the level of 
medical expenditures. Because of budget limitations it is impossible to increase medical expenditures without, for 
example, raising the income tax, decreasing other public expenditures, asking users/patients to pay more when they 
receive medical services. If health policy makers do not want to use this measures they need to find other options to 
fund the new medical interventions. One option would be to replace other treatments by their older versions, which 
are typically less expensive but also less effective, and then to use the freed up money to fund the new treatments. 
This option of replacing other treatments is the topic of this study. 
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What are the consequences of funding new medical interventions? 
 
The decision to replace a treatment by its older version to free up enough money for funding the new version of 
another treatment is difficult to make. The patients who will have access to the newer - more effective - treatment will 
be better off but those who will receive the older - less effective - treatment will be worse off. However health policy 
decision-makers are willing to make this decision because at the end of the day they believe this will improve the 
overall health of the population (all patients confounded) without having to increase healthcare expenditures (or 
eventually by lowering them). 
 
In this example we illustrate the consequences of a decision to replace treatments. Suppose there are two different 
diseases, let’s call them “disease A” and “disease B”, which affect the same number of patients. Treatments are 
currently in place for these two diseases, but a new one has been recently developed for the “disease A” and the 
health policy decision-makers consider the possibility to implement this new treatment that will replace the existing 
treatment. However there is not enough money left out in the healthcare budget. The health policy decision-maker 
decides to get the additional money needed by replacing the current version of the treatment for “disease B” by an 
older version, which is less expensive but less effective. This decision to replace the treatments for both “disease A” 
and “disease B” will have important consequences in terms of health outcomes and medical expenditures. You can 
see an illustration in the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CURRENT 
treatment A 
NEW 
treatment A 
 More effective: Each patient 
gains 4 life years 
 More expensive: Each 
patient costs $100,000 more 
Consequences for patients 
with disease A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CURRENT 
treatment B 
OLD 
treatment B 
 Less effective: Each patient 
loses 2 life years 
 Less expensive: Each patient 
costs $80,000 less 
Consequences for patients 
with disease B 
At the end of the day, for the population: 
 Health is improved 
(On average we gain 1 year of life per patient) 
 
 Medical expenditures increase 
(On average we spend $10,000 per patient ) 
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Funding new treatments is a risky decision 
 
As it is the case with other public policy decisions, health decisions can lead to unexpected results (for example, the 
new treatment may be less effective or more expensive than expected). 
 
Because of this uncertainty in the consequences of health decisions, the decision to replace current treatments may 
improve the overall health of the population as predicted, more than predicted, less than predicted  or even have the 
opposite effect and reduce it, affecting health care expenditures can also be either positive (i.e., no additional funds 
required or even savings) or negative (i.e., additional funds still required). 
 
Health policy decision-makers take into account this uncertainty in the consequences of their decisions by anticipating 
different “scenarios” that they might face. Given these different scenarios and their likelihood to occur, the health 
policy makers will finally decide whether or not it is worth replacing the current treatment “A” by its newer version 
and the current treatment “B” by its older version. 
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Now, it’s your turn to decide 
 
In the remaining of this questionnaire, we are going to ask you to take the seat of the policy decision-makers and to 
make your own decisions of funding new medical interventions. 
We will give you a list of choice tasks. Each choice task is composed of 3 different scenarios describing the 
consequences of replacing current treatments A and B by their new and old versions respectively. In every choice task 
we ask you to select the scenario you think is the BEST and the one you think is the WORST. 
 
 Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
 
Lose 4 years of life in 
good health 
 
Neither lose, nor 
gain years of life in 
good health 
 
Gain 4 years of life in 
good health 
 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by 
$60,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Increase medical 
expenditures by 
$120,000 
Which scenario 
you think is the 
WORST? 
    
Which scenario 
you think is the 
BEST? 

  

 
 
 
 
Few last details before making your own decisions 
 
All the information you need to make your decisions is provided within the choice tasks. For your decisions, it is not 
important to have more details about the exact type of treatments, the profiles and numbers of patients who benefit 
from treatments A and B. 
 
There is no right or wrong answers. What matters is what you think. 
 
We understand that decisions to fund new medical interventions can be difficult. However we would like to ask you 
to take your time and to pay attention to the different pieces of information (number of years of life in good health, 
medical expenditures) before making your own decisions. 
 
Thanks for your attention, now it’s your turn! 
  
This decision means that you would 
consider the scenario #1 as being better 
than scenarios #2 and #3 
This decision means that you would 
consider the scenario #3 as being worse 
than scenarios #1 and #2 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 1 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Lose 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Lose 4 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $60,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 2 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Lose 4 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $60,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 3 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Lose 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Lose 4 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $60,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 4 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Gain 4 years of life in good 
health 
 
Gain 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 5 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Lose 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Lose 4 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $60,000 
 
Increase medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 6 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Gain 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Gain 4 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Increase medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $60,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 7 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
 
Gain 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Increase medical 
expenditures by $60,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 8 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Lose 4 years of life in good 
health 
 
Lose 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Increase medical 
expenditures by $60,000 
 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 9 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Lose 4 years of life in good 
health 
 
Gain 4 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Increase medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 10 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Gain 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Lose 4 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $60,000 
 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 11 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Lose 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Lose 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Increase medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Increase medical 
expenditures by $60,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 12 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Gain 4 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $60,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 13 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
 
Lose 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Increase medical 
expenditures by $60,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 14 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Lose 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Lose 4 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $60,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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 We remind you that the 3 scenarios describe potential consequences of the two decisions:  to replace 
current treatment “A” by its newer version and current treatment “B” by its older version. 
 
CHOICE SET 15 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Lose 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Gain 8 years of life in good 
health 
 
Neither lose, nor gain 
years of life in good health 
Increase medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Decrease medical 
expenditures by $120,000 
 
Neither increase, not 
decrease medical 
expenditures 
 
Which scenario you think is the WORST? 
Which scenario you think is the BEST? 
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The following questions will help us to understand what you have learned from this study about the funding of new 
medical interventions. Please answer each question by RIGHT or WRONG. 
 
 WRONG RIGHT 
1. The healthcare budget is unlimited   
2. One can increase medical expenditures without raising income tax, 
cutting down other public expenditures or asking patients/users to pay 
more 
  
3. It is impossible to replace current treatments by their older versions in 
order to free some resources for other purposes 
  
4. The two decisions to replace treatments consist of replacing a current 
treatment “B” by its newer version and another current treatment “B” 
by its older version 
  
5. The two decisions to replace treatments has consequences for 
different groups of patients, say patients with disease« A » and 
patients  with disease « B » 
  
6. Health policy decision-makers are not interested in improving he 
overall health of the population (all patients confounded) 
  
7. The consequences of the decision to replace treatments cannot be 
known for sure in advance and thus can lead to unexpected results 
such as decrease in overall health of the population 
  
8. Health policy decision-makers take into account the uncertainty in the 
consequences of their decisions by anticipating different scenarios they 
might face at the end of the day 
  
9. The consequences of the decision to replace treatments can be mainly 
described in terms of both gains/losses in the numbers of years of life 
in good health and increases/decreases in the level of medical 
expenditures 
  
 
In taking part to this study, would you say that your knowledge about funding of new medical interventions has 
changed? 
Not at 
all 
         Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
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What are your views about the questionnaire? 
 
How would you rate this questionnaire? 
Not at all 
interesting 
         Extremely 
interesting 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
 
How would you rate the difficulty of this questionnaire? 
Extremely 
difficult 
         Extremely 
easy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
 
How would you rate the quality of this questionnaire? 
Extremely 
good 
         Extremely 
bad 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
 
Do you think the public should be involved in the decisions to fund new medical interventions? 
Not at 
all 
         Yes quite 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
 
How satisfied are you with the healthcare system? 
Fully 
unsatisfied 
         Fully 
satisfied 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
 
Which statement best describes how you answered the choice questions? (Please tick one) 
 I was only concerned with selecting the smallest level of medical expenditures 
 I was only concerned with selecting the largest number of years of life in good health 
 I tried to find a balance (compromise) between medical expenditures and number of years of life in good 
health 
 I randomly selected one of the scenarios 
 
What is the minimum number of years of life in good health that you were willing to accept in your decisions? 
(Please tick one) 
 -8 years (Lose 8 years of life in good health) 
 -4 years (Lose 4 years of life in good health) 
 +0 year (Neither lose, nor gain years of life in good health) 
 +4 years (Gain 4 years of life in good health) 
 +8 years (Gain 8 years of life in good health) 
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What is the maximum level of medical expenditures that you were willing to accept in your decisions? (Please tick 
one) 
 -$120,000 (Decrease medical expenditures by $120,000) 
 -$60,000 (Decrease medical expenditures by $60,000) 
 +$0 (Neither decrease nor increase medical expenditures) 
 +$60,000 (Increase medical expenditures by $60,000) 
 +$120,000 (Increase medical expenditures by $120,000) 
 
What importance did you attach to the number of years of life in good health in your decisions? (Please tick one) 
 Extremely important  
 Very important  
 Moderately important  
 Slightly important 
 Not at all important  
 
What importance did you attach to the medical expenditures in your decisions? (Please tick one) 
 Extremely important  
 Very important  
 Moderately important  
 Slightly important 
 Not at all important  
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Questions about your attitudes towards funding of medical interventions 
 
These questions will help us to understand your views regarding the funding of medical interventions. 
(For each statement please tick the appropriate box) 
Statement I agree I partially 
agree 
I am 
uncertain 
I partially 
disagree 
I disagree 
I am willing to pay more tax to 
increase the health care budget!  
     
People should pay more health care 
services out of their own pocket! 
     
We need a larger health care budget 
in the future! 
     
It is unfair that healthy people pay 
for the treatment of unhealthy 
people! 
     
New medical interventions should 
be adopted at all costs! 
     
Life years of some people should 
not be decrease to increase the life 
years of others! 
     
Patients should be more involved in 
the decision whether a new medical 
intervention will be adopted! 
     
The society should be more involved 
in the decision whether a new 
medical intervention will be 
adopted! 
     
Health care budget could be saved if 
doctors would stop prescribing too 
much medicine! 
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Questions about yourself 
 
Age 
 
Gender 
 
How is your health in general? (Please tick one) 
 Very good 
 Good 
 Fair 
 Bad 
 Very bad 
 
What is your highest level of educational qualifications? (Please tick one) 
 No formal qualifications 
 Secondary/high school qualifications 
 University/College degree 
 Other, please specify 
 
Which group represents your total household income including any benefits received and before any deductions 
(e.g. tax)? (Please tick one) 
 Up to £5,199 per year 
 £5,200 and up to £10,399 per year 
 £10,400 and up to £15,599 per year 
 £15,600 and up to £20,799 per year 
 £20,800 and up to £25,999 per year 
 £26,000 and up to £31,199 per year 
 £31,200 and up to £36,399 per year 
 £36,400 and up to £51,999 per year 
 £52,000 and above per year 
 Prefer not to say 
 
Do you have any of the following chronic conditions (select all those applicable)? 
 Arthrosis 
 Asthma 
 Cancer 
 Chronic Pulmonary Disease 
 Cognitive disorders (Alzheimer disease, Parkinson disease) 
 Diabetis 
 Heart failure 
 Hypertension  
 Kydney disease 
 Mental illness (for example schizophrenia, depression, etc.) 
 Osteoporosis 
 Viral diseases (for example, hepatitis C, HIV/AIDS) 
 Other(s) 
 Prefer not to say 
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ABSTRACT 
Backgound: The final outcome of any resource allocation decision in healthcare cannot be determined in advance. 
Thus decision makers, in deciding which new programme to implement (or not), need to accommodate the 
uncertainty of different potential outcomes (i.e., change in both health and costs) that can occur, the size and 
nature (i.e., “bad” or “good”) of these outcomes and how they are being valued. Using the decision making plane 
(DMP), which explicitly incorporates opportunity costs and relaxes the assumptions of perfect divisibility and 
constant returns to scale of the cost-effectiveness plane, all the potential outcomes of each resource allocation 
decision can be described. 
Objective: In this study we describe the development and testing of an instrument, using a discrete choice 
experiment methodology, allowing the measurement of public preferences for potential outcomes falling in 
different quadrants of the DMP. 
Method: In a sample of 200 participants providing 4,200 observations we compared four versions of the 
preferences-elicitation instrument using a range of indicators. 
Results: We identified one version that was well accepted by the participants and with good measurement 
properties. 
Conclusion:This validated instrument can now be used in a larger representative sample to study the preferences 
of the public for potential outcomes stemming from re-allocation of healthcare resources. 
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Key points for decision makers 
1. A validated preferences-elicitation instrument was developed that can be used in a representative sample of 
the general population 
2. This study found preliminary evidence of non-linearities in public valuation of outcomes stemming from 
reallocation of healthcare resources 
3. This study describes a comprehensive methodology for testing and comparing the properties of preferences-
elicitation instruments, which can be applied to other dicrete choice experiments 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
 
If healthcare budgets were unlimited, all most effective treatments could be adopted. However, resources allocated 
to healthcare are scarce, hence health policy decision-makers (HPDMs) need to decide how to best allocate them. 
Resources scarcity can occur in different contexts (i.e., fixed budgets, shrinking budget with less resources 
allocated to healthcare, growing budget with more resources allocated to healthcare) as long as the total amount 
of resources available is not sufficient to support the implementation of all the most effective treatments. As a 
result of scarcity, HPDMs need to determine where the resources should come from to fund the implementation 
of new treatments to replace or complement existing treatments. For example, in the case of a fixed budget, 
HPDMs may decide to cancel existing treatment(s) in order to free up resources to implement the new 
treatment(s). In the case of a growing budget, because not all new treatments can be implemented, HPDMs would 
still need to decide which new treatment(s) to implement and which ones to abandon. 
 
This resources allocation decision (RAD) is challenging because it typically requires to trade off potential health 
gains for patients who will benefit from the new treatment against potential health losses for those who wi ll see 
their current treatment being cancelled or replaced (or potential new treatment not adopted). In this context, 
HPDMs need to consider the opportunity costs of their decisions to “ensure that the value of what is gained from 
an activity [e.g., implementing the new treatment] outweighs the value of what has to be sacrificed [e.g., cancelling 
an existing treatment]”[1]. 
 
Cost–Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) is widely advocated as a tool to help HPDMs to allocate the resources 
available in a way that maximizes the health benefits produced to the population. The analytical tool of CEA is 
the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER), which is then compared with a threshold ICER to determine 
whether the new treatment should be implemented. Assuming that healthcare resources are efficiently used, this 
threshold ICER should in principle correspond to the ICER of the last treatment adopted [2] and would then 
correspond to the shadow price of the budget constraint. However, it has been shown that this approach would 
lead to an optimal use of healthcare resources only under the strong assumptions of perfect divisibility and constant 
returns to scale of all treatments [3]–[5]. Birch & Gafni (B&G) have suggested an alternative approach relaxing 
these two questionable assumptions [2],[3]. Other studies also questioned the validity of the “ICER of the last 
treatment adopted” as threshold to guide the RAD [6]. Eckerman & Pekarsky showed that the shadow price is 
impacted by different factors such as type of financing (i.e., expansion of healthcare budget vs. displacement of 
existing resources) and whether existing resources were optimally allocated or not. For instance, when funding is 
done by expansion of the healthcare budget in an economically efficient system, the shadow price should 
correspond to the ICER of the “best” (i.e., most cost-effective) existing programme. When the funding is done by 
displacement of existing  resources in an economically inefficient system, the shadow price should depend on the 
ICERs of the “best” programme, of the “worst” (i.e., least cost-effective) programme and of the displaced 
programme [6]. The B&G approach is based on the key concept of opportunity cost. The differences are: (i) It 
does not require the use of underlying unrealistic assumptions and their consequences [3], and (ii) it does not 
require the use of an ICER and a ICER threshold. The B&G approach identifies the source of the additional 
resource requirements of the new program and makes recommendation regarding the adoption of the new program 
based on a direct comparison of the total additional benefits produced from the new program with the total benefits 
forgone. In doing so it ensures, that if followed and under conditions of certainty, “the value of what is gained 
from an activity outweighs the value of what has to be sacrificed” [1]. 
 
In the past two decades it has been recognized that both costs and effects of all programs are stochastic , and then 
the B&G approach has been extended to account for the uncertainty in costs and effects of re-allocating resources 
[7], [8]. Visually, it takes the form of a Decision Making Plane (DMP) allowing to describe all the possible 
outcomes stemming from resource reallocation due to the uncertainty [7]. The cost-effectiveness plane (CEP) 
describes only the difference in health outcomes (E) and costs (C) of a candidate treatment for implementation 
(A1) with a reference one (A0) using measures of incremental effectiveness (∆EA = EA1 − EA0) and increment 
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costs (∆CA = CA1 − CA0). Those measures are used to compute the ICER and compare it to the ICER threshold.  
The DMP “extends” the CEP by also comparing a candidate treatment(s) for cancellation (B1) with another 
reference treatment(s) (B0)1 (i.e., the explicit consideration of the source of additional resources), leading thus to 
another set of incremental effects (∆EB = EB1 − EB0) and costs (∆CB = CB1 − CB0). All these incremental 
measures are used to compute net changes in health outcomes (∆E = ∆EA − ∆EB) and costs (∆C = ∆CA − ∆CB) 
which are then mapped into the DMP (Figure 1A). The DMP is divided into four quadrants which will affect the 
RAD. Quadrant I (QI) describes situations where the joint decision to replace A0 by A1 and B1 by B0 allows 
improving the population health (i.e., E > 0) for an overall lower level of medical expenditures (i.e., C < 0). At 
the opposite, quadrant III (QIII) describes situations where population health is decreased (i.e., E < 0) and medical 
expenditures increased (i.e., C > 0). Quadrant II (QII) describes situations where both the population health and 
level of medical expenditures are decreased (i.e., E < 0; C < 0). Quadrant IV (QIV) describes situations where 
both the population health and level of medical expenditures are increased (i.e., E > 0; C > 0). 
 
In terms of health policy decision-making, the decision to replace existing treatments in order to free up resources 
for the implementation of a new treatment should be made, ideally, only if the final outcome will be located in 
QI. However, this cannot be guaranteed because, as explained, net changes in population health and medical 
expenditures are uncertain, such that RAD becomes a risky decision. Each proposed way of allocating healthcare 
resources might have a non-null probability to end up in each of the four quadrants of the DMP. This uncertainty 
can be represented by a joint distribution of net changes over the DMP (Figure 1B). Given this element of risk, 
the RAD will depend not only on the probabilities of falling in the four DMP quadrants, but also on how HPDMs 
value each possible situations. It would be too restrictive to assume that HPDMs view all potential situations as 
being equally desirable [8]. The valuation of each (E; C) situation is likely to depend on the specific quadrant 
that it falls in and the exact location within the quadrant.  Assuming, for example, that HPDMs positively value 
an improvement in population health and a decrease in the level of medical expenditures, a situation falling in QIII 
should be perceived as “bad” (i.e., to have a negative value), and likewise a QI situation should be seen as “good” 
(i.e., to have a positive value). But this description of HPDMs’ preferences for changes in population health and 
medical expenditures remains largely incomplete. It is unknown whether: (i) HPDMs would be more concerned 
by a “bad” situation rather than a comparable (same-size) “good” situation; (ii) all situations falling in QI (QIII) 
should be seen as equally “good” (“bad”). Also (E; C) situations can fall in quadrants II and IV where one 
outcome is “good” and the other is “bad”.   The answers to these questions depend on both the sign and size of 
HPDMs’ preferences for net changes in population health and medical expenditures. To the best of our knowledge 
such valuation function, that describes the preferences (or value attributed) for every potential outcome in each 
quadrant of the DMP, does not exist. In order to measure such function one first needs to develop and validate a 
tool which will provide reliable measures of preferences for net changes in population health and medical 
expenditures. This is the objective of this study. In this study we report the development and testing of a 
preference-elicitation instrument (PEI) which can be used to measure preferences for changes in population health 
and medical expenditures in a context of resources scarcity. 
 
2: METHODS 
 
2.1: Developing a preference elicitation instrument (PEI) 
 
2.1.1: Choice experiment 
The discrete choice experiment (DCE) methodology was used to measure preferences for net changes in health 
outcomes and costs. DCEs are commonly used in health for eliciting preferences for a wide range of policy 
                                                          
1 The DMP can also be extended to the case where more than one existing treatments have to be replaced in order 
to free up resources for the implement of the new treatment. 
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questions [9], [10]. We use the concept of healthy year equivalent (HYE)2 [11] to describe net changes in health 
outcomes (E) and amount of Euros for net changes in the medical expenditures (C). In our study, we used a 
modified DCE format known as best-worst scaling (BWS) case III. Unlike the standard DCE approach which 
only asks participants to identified their most preferred choice option (i.e., BEST choice), the BWS approach also 
asks them to identify their least preferred option (i.e., WORST choice). This approach allows for a full rank 
ordering of the situations and then provide more information about individuals’ preferences for the same number 
of choice tasks [12]. 
 
Whilst there are studies in the DCE literature explaining how to identify relevant attributes, t o the best of our 
knowledge there is no comparable evidence regarding the selection of attributes’ levels. Furthermore, 
methodological research on the designing of DCEs showed that individuals’ preferences were not invariant to 
changes in the range of attributes’ levels [13]. Unfortunately this issue has been overlooked in the DCE literature 
and there is no validated approach to identify the “best set” of attributes’ levels. In our study we addressed this 
issue by testing and comparing four different versions of the BW-DCE questionnaire that only differ in terms of 
attributes’ levels: The ranges of possible values for the E attribute were {-4; -2; 0; +2; +4} and {-8; -4; 0; +4; 
+8} for versions 1 & 2 (V1-2) and versions 3 & 4 (V3-4) respectively; The ranges of possible values for the C 
attribute were {-60,000; -30,000; 0; +30,000; +60,000} and {-120,000; -60,000; 0; +60,000; +120,000} for V1 
and V2-4 respectively. All four versions were based on a D-Efficient design [14], [15] allowing for the estimation 
of all main effects and one continuous interaction effect between E and C. However, we used non-informative 
(i.e., null) priors about participants’ preferences to generate the list of choice tasks for V1-3 and used results from 
V3 as informative (i.e., non-null) priors to design the tasks for V4. This last version also included 12 experimental 
tasks (instead of 10) to allow for the estimation of two alternative-specific constants in addition to the other 
effects3. 
 
In every choice task we included three generic situations (i.e., scenario 1; scenario 2; scenario 3) (Figure 2) to 
reflect the uncertainty in the consequences of reallocating healthcare resources. In the information sheet of the 
questionnaire, the participants were told that deciding to reallocate resources would have uncertain consequences 
which are represented by the different scenarios. One of these generic situations was designed to correspond to 
the origin point of the DMP, hereafter neutral changes situation (NCS). The specification of the BW-DCE was 
completed by manually designing two quality checks. For the estimation of individuals’ preferences, only answers 
to the experimentally designed choice tasks were considered. The order of the choice tasks within the 
questionnaire and the order of the alternatives within the choice tasks were randomised across participants to 
control for potential order effects (e.g., left-to-right, learning/fatigue). 
 
2.1.2: Sampling 
The development of our PEI took place in France. In 2016, we contacted a market research company to recruit a 
total of 200 participants from the general population. V4 of the instrument was administered two months after the 
first three versions4. Participants were randomly allocated to V1-V3. We used the same recruitment procedure for 
                                                          
2 Those who prefer to use quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) as a measure of health outcome can use the 
methodology described in this paper but will need to change the description of the health outcome in the 
instrument. 
3 We used the same experimental design for V1-3 because we specified null preferences for the E and C 
attributes, making thus the D-efficiency measure insensitive to changes in the magnitude only of the attributes’ 
levels. The purpose of V4 was to investigate whether a “better” (i.e., statistically more efficient) design would 
allow building a better PEI. The gain in statistical efficiency was obtained by relaxing the assumption of null 
preferences for E and C, using V3 as non-null priors for the designing of V4. 
4 The V4 was administered two months after the three other versions because we first needed  to analyse data 
obtained from V3 before being able to improve the statistical efficiency of the V4 design (by using V3 results as 
non-null priors). 
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all four versions. Following Louviere et al (2010) [16] formulae5, we needed to recruit a minimum of 44 
participants per version (rounded up at 50). 
 
2.2: Empirical testing of the preferences-elicitation instrument 
As there is no validated approach regarding the selection of the “best set” of attributes’ levels, we used different 
criteria to compare the four DCE versions in terms of statistical performance (predictive  validity), behavioural 
realism (properties of participants’ choices) and acceptability by the participants. This multi-criteria analysis 
should increase our chance to identify the best PEI. 
 
2.2.1: Debriefing questions 
The participants were asked to rate the interest in and difficulty of the questionnaire on a 5-points scale. Then we 
asked them to answer questions related to how they made their choices: (i) Decision objective (i.e., random choice ; 
decision to minimise C; decision to maximise E; to find a compromise between E and C); (ii) Minimum 
acceptable level of E, and maximum acceptable level of C; (iii) Importance of E and C. Differences between 
the four choice experiments were investigated using Chi-2 tests. 
 
2.2.2: Properties of participants’ choices 
In addition to the experimental choice tasks, we also included two additional tasks to control for the quality of 
participants’ choices. One task was used to check the monotonicity of participants’ choices. In the monotonicity 
task, one option was the best and one was the worst in terms of both E and C. Participants’ were expected to 
choose the best option as “most preferred” and the worst one as “least preferred”. The second quality check 
consisted was a stability task. We tested the stability of choices by repeating task #2 as 2nd last task. Participants 
were expected to pass the stability test when at least one of their choices was repeated.  
 
We also defined two other quality measures based on serial non-participation (i.e., participants who systematically 
select either the left, middle or right-located option) and response time (RT). A participant was classified as serial 
non-participant when s/he selected the NCS situation as BEST in more than 80% of the choice tasks. We recorded 
the RTs at the task level to identify “speedsters” (i.e., participants who tended to answer the choice tasks “too 
quickly”). A “quick decision” was defined as a choice with a RT falling in the 1 st quintile of the corresponding 
RT distribution. A participant was considered as a “speedster” when s/he made quick decisions in at least 80% of 
the choice tasks. We compared the proportions of participants who pass/fail the quality checks using Chi -2 tests. 
 
2.2.3: Behavioural realism 
Multi-attribute choices are typically analysed using the random utility maximisation (RUM) framework [17], [18]. 
 
The “base case” model can be written: 
Untj = β1Entj + β2Cntj + εntj        (Eq. 1) 
 
Where Untj corresponds to the utility (U) derived by respondent (n) at task (t) from the option (j), ntj are modelling 
errors, and the (β1, β2) parameters capture the main effect of a 1-unit change in E attribute (i.e., +1 HYE) and in 
C (i.e., +10,000 euros) on participants’ choices respectively. We expect to find positive preferences for E, 
meaning that on average participants would positively respond to better health outcomes, and negative preferences 
for C, meaning that participants would negatively respond to increase in level of medical expenditures. 
 
However, as suggested by Gafni et al., there is a priori no guarantee that this reference specification provides the 
best account of participants’ decisions [8]. For each version of the choice experiment, we estimated 32 different 
                                                          
5 The formulae is for choice proportions and it allows testing whether observed proportions significantly d iffer 
from proportions that would be obtained by chance (In our case, 33% as there is three choice options per task): 
H0: proportion = 33%; H1: proportion ≠ 33%. 
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specifications allowing for more flexible choice behaviours: (i) Non-linear preferences (in E and/or C); (ii) 
Interaction effect between E and C; (iii) NCS bias; (iv) Choices inconsistency. As the number of parameters 
differs across the models, we used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to identify the best performing 
specification for each version (i.e., the specification associated with the smallest BIC value).  
 
The more sophisticated specification of the choice model would take the following form:  
 
Untj = exp(β1TYPEntj)[β2NCSntj + [β3E{Max loss} + β4E{Min loss} + β5E{Min gain} +
β6E{Max gain}] + [β7C{Max loss} + β8C{Min loss} + β9C{Min gain} + β10C{Max gain}] +
β11(Enjt × Cntj)] + εntj         (Eq. 2) 
 
Where (β1) captures an effect of the type of choices (i.e., BEST vs. WORST) on the errors variance, (β2) a 
preference for the NS above and beyond the preferences for E and C, (β3-β6) are parameters capturing the 
preferences for the different E values relative to a null change, (β7-β10) are similar parameters for the C attribute, 
and finally (β11) is a parameter capturing an interaction effect between E and C. 
 
In terms of behavioural realism of the choice model, the best version is expected to be the one associated with: 
(i) Non-linear preferences for at least one attribute; (ii) Non-significant bias towards NCS; (iii) Significant 
interaction effect between preferences for E and C ([19], [20], [21]). 
 
2.2.4: Predictive validity 
The relative performance of choice models across the four versions of the choice experiment can be compared in 
terms of ability to predict individuals’ choices. We use a cross-validation (CV) procedure to determine the level 
of predictive validity of each model on its corresponding version. The CV procedure consists in randomly splitting 
the sample into two groups, namely an estimation sample and a validation sample. The observations from the 
estimation sample are used to estimate the choice model, and the estimates are then used to predict choices 
observed in validation sample. The predictive validity corresponds to the % of correct matches between predicted 
and observed choices. Because sample sizes are limited, we proceed to a 75%-25% repartition of the respondents 
between the estimation and validation samples respectively. The CV procedure was repeated 10,000 times to 
compute mean score of predictive validity and associated 95% confidence interval. 
 
3: RESULTS 
 
3.1: Samples of respondents 
The proportion of men was approximately 50% in all four samples (44%-50%). About a quarter of the respondents 
reported a less than good health status (20%-30%) and a third declared at least one chronic condition (28%-44%). 
The samples mainly included respondents with a higher level of education (either University or college degree) 
(62%-84%). In overall the differences in sample characteristics across the four versions don’t reach significance, 
thus suggesting there is no sample selection bias (i.e., some profiles of participants are not significantly more 
represented in one group compared to the others). 
 
3.2: Debriefing questions 
Results are reported in Table 1. The descriptive analysis of debriefing questions indicates that overall the 
participants considered the questionnaire as being interesting (≈ 70%) and easy to answer (≈ 50%). A majority of 
participants were willing to trade net changes in health outcomes (E) against net changes in medical expenditures 
(C). V4 appeared to be more interesting (+ 20 points) (P = 0.004) than the other ones. This version also has an 
impact on the individuals’ perception of the E and C attributes. In this version, 48% of the participants declare 
not being willing to accept a net change in health outcomes below +8 HYE (which also corresponds to the 
maximum value presented to the participants). However we don’t find a similar effect for net changes in medical 
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expenditures with only 16% of the participants not being willing to accept an option offering a level of change 
below the maximum value. 
 
3.3: Properties of participants’ choices 
Results are presented in Table 2. Regarding the monotonicity of preferences, all four versions of the choice 
experiment were associated with high levels of performance. However, V4 appeared to perform better than the 
other ones (+10-16 points) but this difference did not reach significance (P = 0.147). V4 outperformed the other 
versions in terms of stability (P < 0.001); it achieved better performance in terms of serial non-participation and 
response time (+6-8 points) but the difference did not reach significance (P = 0.283 and P = 0.580, respectively). 
 
Regarding the results of the RTs analysis, we found a similar pattern of RTs across the four versions of the choice 
experiment. The 1st choice task (task #1) is associated with significantly longer RTs, and then RTs tend to slightly 
decrease over the sequence of tasks. Although most of RT differences between the four versions did not reach 
significance, V4 appeared to be systematically associated with longer RT at every task. This last result might 
indicate that participants might have been more engaged in the completion of the choice tasks [22]. 
 
3.4: Behavioural realism 
Results are presented in Table 36. Regarding V1 and V3, the best fitting choice model appeared to be a model 
allowing for linear preferences for both E and C. At the opposite final model for V2 and V4 allowed for non-
linearities in preferences for E and/or C. In V1 and V3, there was evidence of a NCS bias. In all versions but 
V4 we found a significant interaction effect between preferences for E and C. Overall the results verify our a 
priori assumptions regarding the nature of respondents’ preferences for E and C attributes (i.e., positive effect 
of gains; negative effect of losses; monotonic preferences for changes in E/C). 
 
3.5: Predictive validity 
Results are presented in Figure 3. With a level of predictive validity close to 78%, the version V4 appeared to 
perform significantly better than the other ones. This high level of predictive validity indicates that most of 
participants made choices that can be well explained by the RUM hypothesis, providing thus evidence that 
participants were actually making trade-offs between the E and C attributes. 
 
4: DISCUSSION 
The objective of this study was to develop and test a preferences-elicitation instrument (PEI) that can then be used 
in large representative sample of the general population to identify the outcome valuation function needed to help 
the decision makers to decide whether a given distribution of potential situations is acceptable or not, which will 
affect the decision to reallocate (or not) resources.  After having compared four different versions of the PEI in 
terms of data quality, behavioural realism and predictive validity, version 4 (V4) was identified as best. To the 
best of our knowledge, it is the first time that such an instrument is being developed. A copy of the instrument is 
provided as online supplementary material. 
 
We find that public preferences were sensitive both to the range of values for medical expenditures and health 
outcomes, and to the design of the PEI. The two versions based on “extended” sets of attributes’ values (i.e., V 3 
and V4) outperformed V1 which was based on a “narrow” set of values. Increasing the level of statistical efficiency, 
and thus presumably making the choice tasks more difficult, also had a positive effect on the preferences 
elicitation. In the DCE literature, it is usually argued that participants would respond to an increase in task 
difficulty by adopting simplifying decision rules or making more random decisions [23]. In our case making the 
choice tasks more statistically efficient (and presumably more difficult) was not correlated with an increase in 
perceived difficulty (as reported by the participants). This result suggests that an increase in the statistical 
efficiency of the tasks could also have made the choice situations more realistic and more engaging for the 
                                                          
6 Summary information about all model specifications can be found in online supplementary mate rial. 
Commented [A1]: Comments from the Editor: 
Please cite the copy of the final version of the questionnaire 
in English language (online supplementary material) in the 
main text. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
10 
 
participants, leading this to better quality data. Overall our study results indicate that small changes in the design 
of the choice tasks can have significant effects on stated preferences. This result is consistent with the hypothesis 
of ill-defined/malleable preferences [24], [25] following which  individuals would not know a priori how much 
they value the different product attributes and therefore would “build their preferences on the fly”. Previous studies 
have investigated the effect of manipulating some experimental features, such as level of statistical efficiency, on 
respondents’ choices [26], [27] and provide mixed evidence. 
 
In the past, studies have already used the DCE methodology to investigate public preferences for the allocation of 
healthcare resources [28]–[36]. We cannot compare our results to this literature because our study differs in one 
central feature: the way the resource constraint was described and incorporated. Whilst the previous studies were 
motivated by the context of resources scarcity (i.e., because resources are limited it becomes important to 
understand public preferences regarding how these scarce resource should be used), they did not explicitly 
incorporate the resource constraint in the decision problem (i.e., the question asked). Our study is different because 
it forces the respondent to deal with the consequences of taking into account the opportunity costs of implementing 
a new program (e.g., having to make a decision where a programme(s) have to be cancelled to free up resources 
to implement a new programme and what would be the outcome of such decision). We explained, carefully, to all 
participants the meaning of the concepts of resources scarcity and opportunity costs and their implications when 
making a decision about reallocation of resources. 
 
Our study is not exempt from limitations. First, due to sample size limitation we were unable to explore the impact 
of respondents’ characteristics on their preferences for health outcomes and medical expenditures. Erdem & 
Thompson (2014) used a latent class approach to investigate preferences heterogeneity and found  the existence 
of three different classes of preferences [29]. As this flexible modelling of respondents’ choices requires a large 
amount of data, we plan to repeat this analysis in a bigger sample. Second, the recruitment of the participants was 
done at two different points in time (i.e., participants to the V4 were recruited two months after those for V1-V3) 
which might have introduced a potential bias in our comparison. However, this seems unlikely as (i) the 
recruitment procedure was the same for all four versions, (ii) the main samples socio-demographic characteristics 
did not significantly differ between the four samples, and (iii) the time lag was relatively short (i.e., only two 
months). Our instrument measures preferences for two core elements of the decision making process, namely 
changes in health outcomes and medical expenditures. In real life situations, decision makers are likely to take 
into account more factors (e.g., profile of the patients who will benefit from the new intervention and those who 
will lose, etc.). However, a priori we had no guarantee that members of the general population would be willing 
to make such difficult decisions and then we decided to focus on the core dimensions of resources reallocation. 
There is no point making the the instrument more complex by including other factors in the decision making 
process if public already struggles to trade medical expenditures against health outcomes. Building on this work, 
future studies could further improve the quality of our instrument by including additional factors in the decision 
making problem. While we had no formal way of controlling whether participants did consider other factors when 
making their decisions, we tried to prevent/decrease a potential omission bias by explicitly prompting them to 
only consider the information about health outcomes and medical expenditures. 
 
This validated PEI can now be used in a larger sample of participants to measure their preferences for net changes 
in health outcomes and medical expenditures. This information about public preferences can then be used in 
combination with the information described in the DMP to inform the resources allocation decision (RAD). 
Knowing the joint distribution of net changes in health outcomes and medical expenditures, the preferences 
information can be used, for example, to compute the expected value of implementing the new treatment. The 
HPMs may decide to adopt the new intervention only if, for example, the expected value is positive. By following 
this approach the decision-making process would become more transparent and would allow public to have a say 
in the management of healthcare system by letting their preferences for population health and medical 
expenditures influence the RAD. 
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